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In this paper, we examine whether and how the institutional context matters when 
understanding individuals’ giving to philanthropic organizations. We posit that both the 
individuals’ propensity to give and the amounts given are higher in countries with a stronger 
institutional context for philanthropy. We examine key factors of formal and informal 
institutional contexts for philanthropy at both the organizational and societal levels, including 
regulatory and legislative frameworks, professional standards, and social practices. Our 
results show that while aggregate levels of giving are higher in countries with stronger 
institutionalization, multi-level analyses of 118,788 individuals in 19 countries show limited 
support for the hypothesized relationships between institutional context and philanthropy. 
The findings suggest the need for better comparative data to understand the complex and 
dynamic influences of institutional contexts on charitable giving. This, in turn, would support 






There is abundant research showing how individual motivations and resources influence 
giving to philanthropic organizations1 (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011b; Wiepking & Bekkers, 
2012).  Less is known about how the context in which people live influences this behavior 
(Barman, 2017). This is surprising as it is “certain that philanthropy would not have the form 
it currently does in the absence of the various laws that structure it” (Reich, 2006, p. 17). 
Analogous research on the institutional context for blood and organ donations finds that 
collection regimes of countries strongly influence individual donation behavior (Healy, 2006; 
Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), suggesting that philanthropic donations may be influenced by 
the institutional contexts (Barman, 2007; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989; Mosley & Galaskiewicz, 2010; Sargeant, 1999; Schervish & Havens, 
1997).  
 
In this paper, we contribute to the global philanthropy literature by examining how individual 
charitable giving is associated with the institutional philanthropic context of a country. 
Specifically, we examine key factors of the formal and informal institutional context for 
philanthropy at both the organizational and the societal levels, including regulatory and 
legislative frameworks, professional standards, and social practices. Analyzing how 
institutional contexts relates to individual charitable giving is instrumental for understanding 
how societies can be shaped to contribute, through philanthropy, to benefit others and the 
public good. We test our hypotheses by analyzing merged and synchronized datasets from 19 
countries: The International Individual Philanthropy Database (IIPD). The IIPD uniquely 





To our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically examine how the institutional context 
for philanthropy relates to the individual incidence and level of giving across a range of 
countries. Lacking individual-level data on the amount of philanthropic donations, past 
studies typically used aggregated measures or analyzed data with bivariate correlational 
analyses (CAF, 2017; Einolf, 2016; Sokolowski, 2013). While these studies contributed to an 
initial understanding of global philanthropy, we show that these studies may have 
overestimated support for relationships between institutional contexts and philanthropy.  
 
We also show the importance of considering the demographic characteristics of countries 
when studying the relationship between institutional context for philanthropy and individual 
giving. We find that if people in countries with less developed philanthropic institutional 
context (typically developing economies) had the same average age, level of education and 
income as those in countries with more developed philanthropic institutional contexts, they 
would be equally likely to give and to give similar amounts. This points to a higher relative 
importance of individual level resources for charitable giving, rather than the philanthropic 
infrastructure, at least in relation to the factors of institutionalization included in our study. 
 
Finally, such comparative analysis is critical for the design of evidence-based policies that 
relate institutions to the practice of philanthropy.  Our findings represent a first attempt at 
understanding what factors are associated with the differences in individual philanthropic 
giving across 19 countries, and aim to contribute to a new research agenda focused on 






Theory and hypotheses 
There are large differences in individual giving to philanthropic organizations in different 
countries (Wiepking & Handy, 2015; Wiepking & Handy, 2016b). Figure 1 shows that the 
average annual donation to charity per person ranges from the equivalent of 12 US$ in Russia 
to 1,427 US$ in the United States. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
What contextual underpinnings can explain these large differences in individual giving across 
countries? In a qualitative content analysis of 136 contextual factors identified by experts 
from 26 countries and regions to facilitate or inhibit philanthropy, Wiepking and Handy 
(2015) identified several key factors. These relate to the institutional context for philanthropy 
at both the organizational and the societal level, including regulatory and legislative 
frameworks, professional standards, and social practices.  
 
Our main hypothesis is that the stronger the institutional context for philanthropy is in a 
country, the more likely people are to give and to give higher amounts to philanthropic 
organizations. We use the notion of ‘institutionalization of philanthropy’ to refer to the 
socially constructed system of norms, beliefs and definitions manifested in different 
institutions that shapes an individual’s philanthropic behavior by providing legitimacy (Scott, 
2008) and influences transaction costs for that behavior (North, 1990). We define institutions 
as “aspects of societal structure or human-devised rules of the game of society which give 
‘solidity’ [to social systems] across time and space” (Giddens, 2004, p. 24). In doing so, 
institutions consist of both formal rules (e.g., laws backed by authorized powers) and 
informal ones (e.g., customs or traditions deriving from a set of shared norms), which guide 
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and constrain individual behavior (Scott, 2008).  
 
Formal institutionalization includes the legal framework in a country: laws, contracts and 
judicial rules. In a complex society, such rules govern interactions and transactions. Within 
this class of institutionalization, Ingram and Clay (2000) distinguish public rules made by 
governmental authorities from private rules made by private organizations. Informal 
institutionalization, instead, refers to informal norms as constraints that define our set of 
choices in daily life (North, 1990). Together, public and private institutions that are formal as 
well as informal provide the context in which individuals make gifts to charitable 
organizations.  
 
As we elaborate below, the role of institutions, and regulations more generally, can reduce 
transaction costs for donors (the “supply-side”), and thus positively influence giving. At the 
same time, such regulations may increase transaction costs for organizations (the “demand-
side”)2 and thus could also negatively influence giving, especially for smaller organizations 
and especially in the short-run as they must adopt regulations regarding reporting, 
transparency and fundraising. However, over time, as organizations learn and adapt, and 
become more effective and undertake varied best practices for fundraising, regulations may 
positively influence giving on the demand side as well. Indeed, research at the level of 
individual donors has shown that lowering costs of giving and providing more opportunities 







Regulations and Fiscal Incentives: Formal-public institutionalization 
Regulations that curb the power of philanthropic organizations to commit fraud ensures that 
only legitimate and trustworthy organizations solicit donations. On the one hand, this enables 
individuals to donate while reducing their transaction costs related to monitoring the quality 
of organizations (Hogg, 2017). On the other hand, these and other regulations can increase 
costs for the establishment and operation of philanthropic organizations, reducing giving 
(Huck & Rasul, 2010; Knowles & Servátka, 2015). The regulations may increase barriers to 
entry, and consequently decreases the number of philanthropic organizations and thus provide 
fewer opportunities for charitable donations, consequently reducing overall philanthropy, 
especially in the short term.  On balance, while government regulation, such as compulsory 
registration for organizations involved in fundraising, provides legitimacy to the 
philanthropic sector and lowers transaction costs for individual donors, if too cumbersome for 
organizations it can also reduce giving. 
 
Regulations, posited by North (1992), are driven by the need to create efficiency and resolve 
issues and arising from: (1) information and measurement costs (Can the donor be sure the 
donation will buy the desired service and in the right quantity?); (2) the costliness of the 
exchange and size of the market (How can donors buying service for an unknown third party 
ensure it was done as contracted? How to protect the rights of the donor?); (3) enforcement 
(Who will enforce the rights of the donor?). However, while regulations are designed to 
efficiently resolve these above-mentioned issues, they are in fact, heavily influenced by 
political actors and prevailing ideology (North, 1992). Such influence can raise or lower 
transaction costs for organizations and individuals, change the perception of fairness of the 
regulations and thereby impact the overall sector, in ways that may or may not promote 
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efficiency, illustrated by the case of nonprofit reforms in China described by Hu & Guo 
(2016). 
 
Overall, government regulation is a complex phenomenon varying greatly across countries 
(Breen, Dunn, & Sidel, 2016). Nevertheless, it does contribute to more efficient philanthropic 
organizations, making them attractive to donors (Breen, Dunn, & Sidel, 2016; Cagney & 
Ross, 2013; Marx, 2015). However, if regulations increase transaction costs for nonprofits, if 
they are opaque or difficult to follow or if they are perceived as unfair or undemocratic, they 
may have negative effects on their growth as well raise barriers to entry and limit the 
philanthropic sector (EU Russia Civil Society Forum, 2017; Vandor, Traxler, Millner, & 
Meyer, 2017; Wiepking & Handy, 2015). Due to the complexity of government regulations, 
here we focus only on registration for philanthropic organizations, which is easily 
comparable between countries. We hypothesize: 
 
H1: The ease and fairness in government registration for philanthropic organizations is 
positively related to the individual level of philanthropic giving to charitable organizations in 
a country.  
 
Government regulations that offer fiscal incentives for philanthropic donations also suggest 
that donating is a legitimate, socially desired behavior that is publicly sanctioned. 
Furthermore, fiscal incentives also reduce the ‘price’ of donations to the donor, thereby 





H2: The level of fiscal incentives for philanthropic donations is positively related to the 
individual level of philanthropic giving to charitable organizations in a country. 
 
Education and Training: Formal-private institutionalization  
Philanthropic practices are influenced by formal rules made by private institutions. For 
example, giving may be facilitated by nonprofit education programs and fundraising 
professionalization. Nonprofit education programs are a private form of institutionalization 
that legitimizes philanthropy.3 For example, as the philanthropic sector grows and its 
activities get more specialized, there is a need for personnel that are specially trained to 
manage philanthropic organizations and engage in fundraising (Mirabella, Gemelli, Malcolm, 
& Berger, 2007; Mirabella & Wish, 2001). Thus, the degrees in higher education related to 
management of nonprofits are an indicator of the professionalization of philanthropy. As 
trained personnel typically enhances the benefits and impact of donations made to nonprofits, 
donors are more satisfied and likely to give more (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011a). We 
hypothesize: 
 
H3: The number of nonprofit education programs is positively related to the individual level 
of philanthropic giving to charitable organizations in a country.  
 
A related form of professionalization influencing giving is the training of those soliciting 
donations. Empirical findings show that solicitation is a critical motivator of giving; the 
majority of donations are prompted by a request (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011a; Breeze, 2017; 
Neumayr & Handy, 2019,  Yörük, 2009). Not surprisingly, if individuals are not asked to 
donate, individuals are unlikely to give. Fundraising, done well, can increase donations by 
reducing donors’ transaction costs and raising awareness for the need for donations 
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(Schlegelmilch, Love, & Diamantopoulos, 1997; Wiepking & Maas, 2009; Yörük, 2009). 
When donors are treated well by fundraisers, donors are more satisfied and likely to give 
more (Breeze, 2017). According to Breeze and Scaife (2015), well trained fundraisers follow 
relationship-centric and not transactional fundraising approaches, conduct many different 
types of appeals and are supported by institutions that regulate and promote best practices, all 
of which promotes successful solicitations.  Thus, we expect that a higher degree of 
development of the fundraising professionals will facilitate fundraising, and hence is 
associated with greater level of giving. We hypothesize:  
 
H4: Development of the fundraising profession is positively related to the individual level of 
philanthropic giving to charitable organizations in a country.  
 
Norms: Informal institutionalization 
Informal institutionalization usually refers to group norms, i.e., cognitive schemata that are 
commonly recognized and culturally supported such as customs, taboos or traditions (Ingram 
& Clay, 2000; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014; North, 1990; Scott, 2008). Such informal norms 
are both constraints that may limit and sanction transactions (North, 1990) and cultural lenses 
that give meaning to social phenomena (Scott, 2008). Although government legislation is part 
of the formal-public institutionalization, we suggest that government funding of nonprofits is 
the reflection of a group norm. Government grants are used to signal the legitimacy of the 
nonprofit sector (Handy, 2000; Heutel, 2014) and also signal desired social behavior as 





Government funding could be “crowding-out” philanthropic giving (Pennerstorfer & 
Neumayr, 2017; Sokolowski, 2013; Bekkers & De Wit, 2013; De Wit, Neumayr, Handy, & 
Wiepking, 2018). This is supported by evidence in laboratory experiments, but studies that 
use field data generally find little evidence (Bekkers & De Wit, 2013; Lu, 2016). In the 
practice of philanthropy, it is more likely that decisions are guided by shared beliefs about 
what are ‘good’ philanthropic causes, which may result in “crowding-in”. We argue that 
government funding reflects such shared beliefs.  We hypothesize that, in general, the larger 
the share of the funding received from the government by nonprofits, the more their activities 
are perceived as relevant and necessary, which in turn increases individuals’ giving.  
 
H5: A higher share of government funding for philanthropic organizations is positively 
related to the individual level of philanthropic giving to charitable organizations in a 
country. 
 
A final form of informal institutionalization of philanthropy relates to the social norms that 
encourage philanthropy. When social norms are more supportive of giving, it will positively 
influence individual giving (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Simpson & Willer, 2015). For 
example, religious norms for giving are especially strong, and exist across almost all 
religions, inspiring charity in their adherents (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Bennett & Einolf, 
2017; Wuthnow, 1991). We hypothesize:  
 
H6: The proportion of people in a country that is religiously affiliated is positively related to 




In formulating these hypotheses, we are cautious in suggesting that there exists a uni-
directionality in these relationships; just as institutions shape individuals’ behavior, so too do 
individuals shape institutions. For example, it may well be that an easy and fair nonprofit 
registration system will emerge only when there a sufficient level of philanthropic activity, as 
very low philanthropic activity may not trigger a need for a bureaucratic registration process. 
However, after a certain threshold of philanthropic activity, governments may decide that 
registration of nonprofits would reduce fraudulent behaviors as well as information and 
monitoring costs to donors. Registration reduces transaction costs to donors, and this in itself 
may spur increased philanthropic activity. Similarly, it can be argued that when philanthropic 
activity is high, nonprofits can lobby for fiscal incentives (although the governments’ 
resistance may also be high if the cost to the treasury is perceived sufficiently large). Given 
that the only data currently available to test our hypotheses is cross-sectional, such 
directionality or causality cannot be determined, and thus our findings needed to be 
interpreted with caution.4  
 
Data and measures 
Research documents the ubiquitous presence of philanthropy across the world, but most 
studies thus far have concentrated on single countries or regions, especially in Western 
Europe and North America, and typically analyze only aggregated country-level data about 
individual philanthropic behavior (e.g., Bekkers, Schuyt, & Gouwenberg, 2017; ESS, 2002; 
Papacostas, 2008; Giving USA, 2016; Hoolwerf & Schuyt, 2017; Philanthropy Age, 2016). 
One exception is the Gallup World Poll, but these data are not publicly available and only 
provide the incidence of giving, and not amounts donated (Gallup, 2018), which we argue is 
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key in understanding the relationship between institutional contexts and individual donating 
(Wiepking & Handy, 2015a).  
 
A new and unique database, created by Wiepking and Handy (2016b), merged and 
synchronized micro-level datasets from 19 countries: The Individual International 
Philanthropy Database (IIPD). It includes the incidence and amounts of individual donations 
as well as relevant individual-level characteristics: gender, age, marital status, income and 
level of educational achievement. Data were collected using probability-based sampling in 
Australia (Lyons & Passey, 2007), Austria (Neumayr & Schober, 2009), Canada (CSGVP, 
2004), France (Wiepking, 2009), the Netherlands (Wiepking, Bekkers, Schuyt, & 
Gouwenberg, 2006), the United Kingdom (Low, Butt, Paine, & Smith, 2007), the United 
States (Wilhelm, 2005), Norway (Wollebæk & Sivesind, 2010), Finland (Pessi & Grönlund, 
2008), Mexico (ENAFI, 2005), South Korea (The Beautiful Foundation, 2006), Japan (Japan 
Fundraising Association, 2010), Indonesia (Strauss, Witoelar, Sikoki, & Wattie, 2009), 
Taiwan (TSCS, 2009), Israel (Haski-Leventhal, Katz, & Yogev-Keren, 2011), Ireland (HBS, 
2005), Russia (CSCSNS, 2010), Germany (Schupp, 2009; Wagner et al., 2010), and 
Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen & Freitag, 2011). The IIPD is a non-overlapping multiple 
frame sample (Kaminska & Lynn, 2017). 
 
There exists several methodological weaknesses, i.e., different timeframes, sampling methods 
(Abraham, Helms, & Presser, 2009) and questionnaires (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2006; Rooney, 
Steinberg, & Schervish, 2004) were used. These differences may lead to different estimated 
relationships between factors of institutionalization and philanthropic giving. However, until 
other micro-level data is collected, the IIPD is the best available data to test relationships 
between institutional contexts and individual philanthropy across a range of countries. More 
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information on datasets is available in Online Appendix A, and in the IIPD documentation 
(Wiepking & Handy, 2016a). 
 
In the IIPD, the proportion of the population surveyed differs strongly between countries. 
Following Kaminska and Lynn (2017) a cross-national weight, reflecting the relative 
inclusion probability within each country, was created using population scaling: 
 
Wsij = Nj / nj 
 
Where Wsij is the national population weight for the unit i in country j; 
Nj is the sample size in country j; 
And nj is the population size
5 of country j. 
 
The IIPD consists of 138,927 respondents in 19 countries. The country datasets in the IIPD 
were collected between 2004 and 2011, depending on the availability of data at the country-
level. List-wise deletion was used for missing values, resulting in 118,788 respondents from 
19 countries.  
 
Table 1 provides describes the measurements used; Table 2 provides an overview of the 
measures of philanthropy and institutionalization; and Table 3 provides descriptive statistics 
for measures of institutionalization examined.6  
  




Table 4 shows the bivariate correlation between the measures of institutionalization (with 
continuous measures) and amounts donated (individual and aggregated country level). When 
it is easier to form, register, operate, and dissolve philanthropic organizations, when there are 
more nonprofit education programs, and when the proportion of nonprofit revenue from 
public sources is higher, people give higher amounts. We find no relationship between the 
proportion of religiously affiliated in a country and levels of giving. Interestingly, the 
correlation between country-level average donation and the significantly related measures of 
institutionalization is between 0.25 (nonprofit revenue from public sources) and 0.45 (ease of 
forming philanthropic organizations) stronger than for individual-level donations, suggesting 
that cross-national studies using aggregate measures may overestimate relationships.7 
 
Table 5 shows the average proportion of donors and average donations for each of the fiscal 
incentive categories. Dismissing the results for fiscal incentives represented by only one 
country (categories 4 to 7), people in countries with a combination of an egalitarian and 
pragmatic fiscal incentive system are most likely to give and give the highest amounts to 
charitable organizations. While the likelihood of giving is similar for people in a pure 
egalitarian or pragmatic fiscal regime, people in a pragmatic regime donate on average higher 
amounts. 
 
The relationship between fundraising regimes and giving in Table 6, shows that the 
likelihood of giving does not necessarily increase with advancement of fundraising regimes 
(i.e., development of the profession, technology, positive public attitudes towards 
fundraising). People are most likely to give in established fundraising regimes (the fourth 
category), followed by advanced regimes (only represented by the US), and emerging and 
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evident regimes. The relationship between a fundraising regime and donations is as expected; 
the more advanced a fundraising regime, the higher the average amounts people give. 
 
[Tables 4, 5 and 6 here] 
 
Analytical models 
To understand the relationships between the institutionalization measures and the incidence 
and level of giving, we tested the relationship using multilevel mixed-effects logistic 
regression analyses (Table 7) and Maximum Likelihood (ML) mixed-effects multilevel 
models (Table 8) using Stata 15.  In multilevel analyses, the clustering of individuals within 
countries is considered to avoid the issues arising in previous studies, which used aggregated 
data in combination with bivariate correlational analyses. We estimated the predicted 
probability and linear prediction of donating for different institutional measures (Figure 2 and 
3 and Tables 9 and 10).  
 
Results 
The relationship between institutional context and the likelihood of giving 
Table 7 displays the results from maximum likelihood multilevel mixed-effects regression 
analyses of the likelihood of giving.8,9 The first column shows results from a model including 
only the individual-level control variables.10 In each subsequent model we include one of the 
contextual measures of institutionalization. Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of 
donating, estimated using the results from Table 7. The predicted probability of donating for 
an individual in a country with various levels of ease of forming philanthropic institutions is 
calculated based on Model 1 in Table 7, keeping all other covariates at their full sample 
means. The predicted probabilities in Figure 2 indicates that the relationship between the 
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number of nonprofit education programs and the proportion of the population religiously 
affiliated and the likelihood of giving is positive as expected.  
 
Unexpectedly, the relationships between the ease of forming philanthropic organizations and 
the proportion of nonprofit revenue from public sources and the likelihood of giving are 
negative. From Figure 2 and the odds ratios in Table 7, we note that most of the measures of 
institutionalization are not significantly related with the likelihood of giving, showing little 
support for the hypotheses. Table 7, however, does show a significant relationship between 
an established fundraising regime (compared to an evident regime) and the likelihood of 
making donations. Hence these results only provide support for hypothesis 4 and then only 
specifically for one type of fundraising regime. 
 
[ Table 7 and Figure 2 here] 
 
The relationship between institutional context and the level of giving 
Table 8 displays the results from a maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel linear 
regression analyses of the natural log of the amount donated.11 Figure 3 displays the linear 
prediction of the natural log of the amount donated, estimated using the results from Table 8.  
 
[ Table 8 and Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that all relationships are as expected: in countries where it is easier to form 
philanthropic organizations, with more nonprofit education programs, where a higher 
proportion of the revenues of nonprofits comes from public sources, or where a higher 
proportion of the population is religiously affiliated, people are predicted to donate, on 
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average, higher amounts. However, as can be seen from the coefficient estimates in the 
models in Table 8, most of our hypotheses were not supported. We do find partial support for 
hypothesis 2: People in a combination of an egalitarian and pragmatic fiscal system are 
estimated to donate higher amounts than people in (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional 
or restrictive systems (Model 2 in Table 8). Hypothesis 4 is also partially supported. People 
in an established fundraising regime are estimated to give higher amounts than people in an 
evident fundraising regime (Model 3 in Table 8).  To further understand relationships 
between fiscal incentive systems, fundraising professionalism and incidence and level of 
giving, we show the predicted probability and the linear prediction of giving for the different 
categories of fiscal incentive systems (Table 9) and fundraising regimes (Table 10). 
 
[ Tables 9 and 10 here] 
 
Table 9 shows that people in a combination of an egalitarian and pragmatic fiscal system are 
predicted to donate 102 US$, compared with 24 US$ (pure pragmatic system) and 14 US$ 
(pure egalitarian system). Canada and France are countries classified by CAF (2016) as 
egalitarian tax incentive regimes where tax credits have equal benefit for all donors; however 
the weakness of egalitarian regimes is that the fiscal benefits may be more complex and not 
easily claimed by donors than those in pragmatic regimes. Pragmatic regimes, such as the 
United States and Australia, are those where fiscal benefits are relatively easier apply for but 
those with higher incomes receive higher benefits (CAF, 2016). Our results suggest that a 
combination of an egalitarian and pragmatic regime may be most beneficial to individual 
philanthropy, partially supporting hypothesis 2. However, as our data includes only two 
countries classified as a combination between egalitarian and pragmatic regime, Switzerland 




People in an established fundraising regime have a predicted probability of donating of 81 
percent (Table 10), and are predicted to donate 41 US$, as compared to 13 US$ in an evident 
fundraising regime. This finding partly supports our fourth hypothesis, suggesting that people 
in established fundraising regimes are more likely to give and give higher amounts. 
 
Comparing results in Table 9 and 10 with the bivariate statistics in Table 5 and 6 illustrates 
that countries’ demographics influences relationships between fiscal incentive systems, type 
of fundraising regime, and philanthropic giving. Especially the bivariate results for the ‘less 
institutionalized’ countries in fiscal system and fundraising regime seem to be driven, at least 
partly, by these countries’ demographics, which are less favorable for donating (e.g., 
populations are younger, less wealthy and less educated). If people in transitional and 
restrictive fiscal systems, and embryonic fundraising regimes in particular, had similar levels 
of income (and to a lesser extent similar ages and education), they may be just as (or even 
more) generous than people in countries with more advanced types of fiscal systems and 
fundraising regimes. 
 
We conducted several robustness tests, controlling for per capita Gross National Income 
(GNI) in the multilevel analyses, estimating the multi-level models using the amounts 
donated relative to a country’s per capita GNI, leaving potentially influential countries out of 
the analyses, and including all measures of institutionalization in one model. The results of 
these tests do not lead to different findings than reported. A description of these robustness 





Conclusion and discussion 
We examined how the institutional context for philanthropy, manifested in different formal 
and informal institutions, relates to individual philanthropic behavior across a range of 19 
countries. We argued that the stronger the institutional context for philanthropy is in a 
country, the more people are likely to give and to give higher amounts to philanthropic 
organizations. In other words, the more strongly philanthropy is supported by organizational 
and societal structures, the more donors will give.  
 
We find that –considering bivariate statistics and simple correlational tests – when there is 
more ease and fairness in government registration for philanthropic organizations, when the 
fiscal incentive system for philanthropic giving can be characterized as both egalitarian and 
pragmatic (e.g., United Kingdom and Switzerland), when there are more formal training 
opportunities for people working in the philanthropic sector, when fundraising is more 
developed, when there is proportional more government funding for philanthropic 
organizations, people are more likely to give, and give higher amounts of money to 
philanthropic organizations. Thus, at the bivariate level, the institutionalization of 
philanthropy through formal and informal rules positively relates to more and higher 
individual giving to philanthropic organizations. 
 
However, these results pertain strictly to bivariate statistics and bivariate correlational tests. 
When using multilevel analyses, we find less support for our ideas. The results of these more 
stringent analyses show that only people in an established fundraising regime have a higher 
probability of donating and give higher amounts compared with people in an evident 
fundraising regime. In addition, we found that people in a combination of egalitarian and 
pragmatic fiscal incentive regime are predicted to donate higher amounts than people in 
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(combinations) of pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems. However, as 
our data includes only two countries classified as a combination between egalitarian and 
pragmatic regime, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, further research is needed to 
establish this finding.  
 
The results are also suggestive of a positive relation between the number of nonprofit 
education programs and the predicted level of giving in a country (p ≤ .10). We do not find 
support for any of the other expected relationships. This leads us to the first important 
message from our study: Past empirical comparative studies of philanthropy, that examined 
only bivariate correlational relationships using only aggregated measures for individual 
philanthropic giving, may well have overestimated or over-stated relationships.  
 
Although not hypothesized, a significant finding for the understanding of global 
philanthropy, is that if people in countries with lower levels of philanthropic 
institutionalization, typically developing economies, had the same average age and level of 
education and especially income as those in countries with more advanced levels of 
philanthropic institutionalization, they would be equally likely to give and give similar 
amounts. Indeed, a large part of the variation between countries in the individual likelihood 
of giving and level of giving can be explained by compositional demographic differences 
between countries’ populations. From our results it can be expected that when populations in 
developing economies start to resemble populations in developed economies more, we expect 
the likelihood and level of giving in developing economies will go up, independent of the 




When interpreting the results, we bear in mind the relatively low number of countries 
included in our study, and thus the limitations in the generalizability of our findings. 
Nevertheless, our results are the first of their kind and point to relationships that could spur 
further research.  Although the 19 countries in the IIPD represent twenty-one percent of the 
world’s population (United Nations, 2017), there is an overrepresentation of countries 
situated in Western-Europe, North America and Asia. Furthermore, Elff, Heisig, Schaeffer, 
and Shikano (2016) suggest that using a REML estimation eliminates the bias in multilevel 
analyses with a low number of countries. In a robustness test (see Online Appendix C), the 
REML estimation produced similar results as the multi-level estimation, suggesting that the 
results are not biased. However, we do expect the results are driven by the selection of 
countries included in our study. Excluding Germany and Japan, which were the two countries 
that followed different logics of institutionalization, resulted in somewhat stronger support 
for our hypotheses (see Online Appendices D1 and D2).  
 
At this time, the IIPD is the only dataset that allows studying how institutional context relates 
to individual-level philanthropic behavior. Hence, it is not possible to test our data using a 
larger and less selective range of countries, or data that have been collected using one 
standardized methodology and survey. We tried to correct the flaws in these data and 
reported our results conservatively and with caution. Hence, we refrain from policy 
recommendations based on our results.  
 
Our findings first need to be replicated, in further research using a less selective sample and a 
higher number of countries, and measurements of philanthropy that capture giving across all 
countries. To rule out the possibility that our hypotheses were not supported because of 
measurement problems, future studies should include additional and possibly more direct 
30 
 
measures. Our findings, we hope will spur scholars and philanthropy professionals to engage 
in global philanthropy research, contributing to the collection of longitudinal data and 
comparative analyses. With new data, longitudinal analyses become a possibility, which can 
address some of the problems with causal inference inherent in cross-sectional designs. While 
formal and informal institutionalization of philanthropy is continuously being shaped, there is 
a need for evidence-based policies. Through this, future global philanthropy research can 
contribute to an understanding of how philanthropy can be a source of societal wellbeing for 




1 Philanthropic organizations are also known as nonprofit organizations or not-for-profit 
organizations, but we will use the term “philanthropic organizations” consistently to refer to 
these organizations throughout this article. The definition for philanthropic organizations 
varies across countries, but according to Salamon and Anheier (1992), the common 
characteristics are that they are private (non-governmental), self-governing organizations, 
which on a voluntary basis distribute goods and services to benefit a public purpose, without 
the primary goal of making profits for their owners.  
2 We thank our anonymous reviewer for this insight.  
3 We acknowledge that depending on the country, education programs for philanthropy 
professionals could also be part of formal-public institutionalization. 
4 In a previous version of this paper, we examined the proportion of volunteers in a country as 
a correlate of amounts donated. We did not find a relationship between proportion volunteers 
in a country and incidence and amounts donated. 
5 We used population size in 2003, the year preceding all measures of giving in the IIPD 
(United Nations, 2017). 
6 The correlations between measures of institutionalization is displayed in Online Appendix 
B. Except for the proportion of nonprofit revenue from public sources and the fiscal incentive 
systems, we included measures of institutionalization that were captured by one source to 
increase reliability of these measures: ease of forming philanthropic organizations (Adelman, 
Barnett, & Russell, 2015); number of nonprofit education programs (Mirabella et al., 2007; 
Mirabella & Wish, 2001); type of fundraising regimes (Breeze & Scaife, 2015); proportion 
religiously affiliated (Pew Research Center, 2012). For the proportion of nonprofit revenue 
from public sources, we supplemented the primary data source (Salamon, Sokolowski, & 
Haddock, 2017) with data from the Palgrave Handbook on Global Philanthropy (Wiepking & 
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Handy, 2015a). For the fiscal incentive systems, the primary data source (CAF, 2016) was 
supplemented by country experts (Table 1). 
7 This phenomenon, where an association at the population level may be much weaker or 
even reversed within subgroups of that population, is documented in the ecological fallacy 
literature (Kievit et al. 2013; Robinson 2009; Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, & Subramanian 2011). 
8 Ideally, we would include the six measures of institutionalization in one model in the 
multilevel analyses. However, with only 19 countries in the study, six contextual level 
variables may produce biased results. As a robustness test, we did include all measures of 
institutionalization in one model; see Online Appendix F for the results. We also created a 
composite measure for the overall level of philanthropic institutionalization in a country, 
using Factor Analysis on the six contextual level variables measuring institutionalization. 
From the factor analysis using oblimin rotation we retained one factor with an eigenvalue 
over 1. We included the factor scores in the maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel 
logistic and linear regression, where it functioned as a composite measurement of all 
institutionalization measurements. The results showed no relationships between this 
composite measure and likelihood of giving and amounts donated. 
9 Results are calculated using xtmelogit in Stata 15. 
10 The intraclass correlation (ICC) for the model including only individual control variables is 
0.251, indicating that 25 percent of the variance in the likelihood of giving can be explained 
by the context in which individuals live. We expect that the ICC also captures a design effect, 
as there are differences in survey design between countries. The ICC likely captures both the 
‘true’ contextual variance in the likelihood of giving as well as variance caused by different 
survey designs. The ICC of the different models finds the contextual level variance remains 
unexplained by our institutionalization measures. The likelihood ratio test (LR test) to test the 
goodness-of-fit of the models including contextual institutionalization measures finds only 
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the model including the proportion of nonprofit revenue from public sources (Model 5) is 
significantly a better fit for the data compared with the corresponding model only including 
individual-level control variables (p ≤ 0.001).  
11 Results are calculated using xtmixed in Stata 15. The first column in Table 8 shows the 
results from a model including the individual level control variables. The ICCs of the 
different models in Table 8 show that only models including fiscal incentive systems (Model 
2, Table 8), fundraising regimes (Model 3, Table 8) and number of nonprofit education 
programs (Model 4, Table 8) explain a little of the contextual level variance in amounts 
donated, respectively 4.9 percent, 3.9 percent and 1.7 percent. LR tests show that the model 
including the proportion nonprofit revenue from public sources (Model 5) fits the data 
significantly better than the corresponding model with individual level control variables only 
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  Table 1. Measurements 
 
Dependent variables 
Incidence and level of philanthropic gifts. Across most datasets included in the IIPD, respondents have been 
asked whether or not they made any philanthropic donations over the period of a year, and if so, how much 
they donated.1 Amount donated is calculated in 2012 US Dollars. To limit the influence of outliers on our 
results, for each country we winsorized the level of philanthropic gifts at 99 percent, thus setting the top one 
percent donations to the level of the 99th percentile donation (Tukey, 1962; De Wit et al., 2018). We analyze 
the natural log of amount donated in our analyses, which estimates the relationship between the measures of 
institutionalization and the relative change in individual amounts donated. 
 
Measures of institutionalization 
Ease of forming philanthropic organizations. The Hudson Institute’s Index of Philanthropic Freedom 2015 
(Adelman et al., 2015) includes a measure for the ease, and to some extend fairness, of forming, registering, 
operating, and dissolving philanthropic organizations. This measure is based on an opinion survey under 
experts representing their countries of expertise, providing a score from one to five to each of the following 
three items: 1) To what extent can individuals form and incorporate the organizations defined?; 2) To what 
extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference?; 3) To what extent is there 
government discretion in shutting down CSOs? The average score on these three questions is used as the 
measure of philanthropic freedom. A higher score indicates more philanthropic freedom. Israel, Norway, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Switzerland were not included in the 2015 Index of Philanthropic Freedom. The 
scores for these countries were provided by the philanthropy country experts who participated in this 
project. 
 
Fiscal incentives system. A report by the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF, 2016) surveyed lawyers across 26 
countries and created seven typologies of tax incentive systems: 1) Egalitarian; 2) Egalitarian & Pragmatic; 
3) Pragmatic; 4) Pragmatic & Transitional; 5) Transitional; 6) Transitional & Restrictive; 7) Restrictive. The 
CAF did not classify the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, South Korea, Austria, Indonesia, Japan, Israel, 
Germany and Switzerland. We asked the country experts involved in this project to classify their country 
according to this typology. Egalitarian regimes are focused on creating equal fiscal incentives for all donors. 
This does cause these regimes to be more complex to understand and use by donors than for example 
pragmatic regimes. Pragmatic regimes, such as the United States and Australia, may be easier to understand, 
but in those regimes the benefits are not equally distributed. Typically, those with higher incomes receive 
higher benefits. Transitional systems are categorized as easy to understand, and allowing for future 
liberalization, but typically have poor incentives for ordinary donors. Restrictive regimes are typically 
heavily politicized, include a narrow range of causes and discourage individuals to claim tax deduction for 
donations (CAF, 2016). 
  
Number of nonprofit education programs. The number of professional training venues for philanthropy 
professionals is based on research done by Mirabella and colleagues (Mirabella & Wish, 2001; Mirabella et 
al., 2007). For the United States, they inventoried the number of graduate degree programs with at least one 
course in the management of nonprofit organizations (Mirabella & Wish, 2001). In a study from 2007, they 
surveyed universities and colleges worldwide to locate programs in nonprofit management education. For 
Indonesia, which was not included in these studies, we conducted an online search in 2016 and found no 
evidence for nonprofit management education programs.  
 
Type of fundraising regime. Breeze & Scaife (2015) designed a typology of five types of fundraising 
regimes indicating the level of development of the fundraising profession and fundraising technology and 
more positive public attitudes towards fundraising among the public. Based on these characteristics, they 
classified the countries included in the IIPD according to this typology of fundraising regimes, where 
countries with the lowest levels of development on these criteria were classified as embryonic regimes, and 
countries with the highest level of development were classified as advanced regimes. The five types of 
fundraising regimes:: 1) Embryonic fund-raising regimes; 2) Emerging fund-raising regimes; 3) Evident 
fund-raising regimes; 4) Established fund-raising regimes; 5) Advanced fund-raising regimes.  
 
Proportion nonprofit revenue from public sources: We use the proportion of philanthropic organizations’ 
revenue coming from public sector sources, as estimated in the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project (Salamon et al., 2017, appendix B, p. 277). Across the 41 countries included in this project, 
governments provided on average 35.3% of the funding for philanthropic organizations in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century (Salamon et al., 2017)2. No information was available for Taiwan and 
Indonesia. For Taiwan the Palgrave Handbook on Global Philanthropy (Wiepking & Handy, 2015) 
provides an estimation of percentage of philanthropic organizations’ revenue coming from public sector 




Notes: 1 In the datasets from the United Kingdom and Indonesia the reference period was four weeks and in the 
dataset from Ireland, the average weekly donation was included (based on a reference period of two weeks), we 
recalculated this to the total amount donated over the course of a year, by multiplying the amount donated with 
respectively 13 and 52. Of course this also has consequences for the proportion of donors in those countries, 
which is likely underestimated compared to the other countries in the IIPD, which use a yearly reference period 
for measuring donations. The dataset from the United States only captures donations above 25 U.S. dollar; 2 
This measure is based on the “Government share of CS revenue (%)” in Salamon, Sokolowski and Haddock 
(2017:279). They provide the following definition: “The revenues of civil society organizations come from a 
variety of sources. For the sake of convenience, we have grouped these into three categories: fees, which 
includes private payment for services, membership dues, and investment income; philanthropy, which includes 
individual giving, foundation giving and corporate giving; and government or public sector support, which 
includes grants, contracts, and voucher or third-party payments from all levels of government, including 
government financed social security systems that operate as quasi-nongovernmental organizations." (Salamon et 
al. 2017:274). The last category is the “Government share of CS revenue (%)”. We could not find the exact 
years the proportion nonprofit revenue from public sources pertain to for the various countries included in the 
John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Salamon, Sokolowski & Haddock state that the data for 
the project have been “collected at different time periods (between 1995 and 2008) […]” (Salamon et al., 
2017:274); 3 Pew Research Center (2012) derived the proportion of religiously unaffiliated from the 2010 
revision of the United Nations World Population Prospects Data 2010 (United Nations 2011), which we were 
unable to gain direct access to. We acknowledge that the proportion of religiously affiliated may differ from the 
proportion we estimate by using (1 – the proportion of religiously unaffiliated), and that there may be 
differences across countries in whether someone who is identified as ‘not religiously unaffiliated’ is religiously 
affiliated. 
Proportion religiously affiliated. We were unable to locate a measure for the proportion of people indicating 
to have a religious affiliation in a country for years preceding the measures for giving in the IIPD. We were 
able to locate the proportion of people estimated to not belong to any religious affiliation in all countries in 
the IIPD for 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2012). We used (1 – the proportion religiously unaffiliated to 
estimate the proportion religiously affiliated).3 
  
Individual level control variables 
The analyses control for individual level measures of age in years, gender, educational level in three 
categories, whether or not the respondent is married, and the natural log of income.  
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Australia 6,175 0.88 480 4.9 3 9  4 0.31 0.76 
Austria 816 0.65 53 4.4 3 1  3 0.50 0.87 
Canada 19,486 0.89 374 4.7 1 19  4 0.50 0.76 
Finland 755 0.74 29 4.9 4 3  3 0.36 0.82 
France 1,195 0.66 158 4.3 1 1  4 0.58 0.72 
Germany 15,194 0.43 127 5.0 3 5  4 0.64 0.75 
Indonesia 10,412 0.49 34 3.0 7 0  1 n/a 1.00 
Ireland 6,884 0.62 556 4.7 1 2  3 0.77 0.94 
Israel 830 0.51 362 4.5 3 5  3 0.64 0.97 
Japan 5,072 0.35 30 4.7 1 8  3 0.45 0.43 
Mexico 2,972 0.84 27 4.0 5 1  2 0.09 0.95 
Netherlands 1,365 0.94 326 5.0 3 2  4 0.59 0.58 
Norway 1,937 0.66 228 5.0 3 1  3 0.35 0.90 
Russia 28,176 0.40 12 2.1 6 1  2 0.11 0.84 
South Korea 995 0.78 183 3.3 1 7  3 0.24 0.54 
Switzerland 5,719 0.80 539 5.0 2 3  4 0.35 0.88 
Taiwan 1,869 0.63 159 4.7 3 1  2 0.28 0.87 
United Kingdom 1,685 0.95 989 4.7 2 22  4 0.47 0.79 
United States 7,251 0.65 1427 4.7 3 137  5 0.31 0.84 
Notes: for a description of the variables, see Table 1; 1 in 2012 US Dollar (winzorized). 
Sources: IIPD (2016); a Hudson Institute’s Index of Philanthropic Freedom (Adelman et al., 2015), from no philanthropic freedom (1) to 
complete philanthropic freedom (5); b Charities Aid Foundation (CAF, 2016), seven systems, from egalitarian to restrictive: 1 "Egalitarian" 2 
"Egalitarian & Pragmatic" 3 "Pragmatic" 4 "Pragmatic & Transitional" 5 "Transitional" 6 "Transitional & Restrictive" 7 "Restrictive"; c United 
States: Mirabella & Wish (2001); all other countries (except Indonesia): Mirabella et al. (2007); d Palgrave Handbook on Global Philanthropy 
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(Breeze & Scaife, 2015), from embryonic to advanced: 1 "Embryonic fund-raising regimes" 2 "Emerging" 3 "Evident" 4 "Established" 5 
"Advanced"; e John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock, 2017) and Palgrave Handbook on 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the measures of institutionalization 
Variable Nindividual Ncountry Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ease of forming philanthropic 
organizations 
118,788 19 4.04 1.06 2.4 5 
Fiscal incentives system 118,788 19 3.49 2.14 1 7 
Number of nonprofit education 
programs1 
111,537 18 5.95 6.90 0 22 
Type of fundraising regime 118,788 19 3.10 1.14 1 5 
Proportion nonprofit revenue 
from public sources2 
108,376 18 0.39 0.20 0.11 0.75 
Proportion religiously 
affiliated 
118,788 19 0.81 0.12 0.43 1.00 
Notes: 1 without US, as US has 137 NP programs, outlier; 2 no information available for 
Indonesia. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & 
Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center 
(2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015).  
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Table 4. Correlation between measures of institutionalization and amount donated to 
charitable organizations 








Ease of forming philanthropic organizations 0.37*** 0.82*** 
Number of nonprofit education programs2 0.22*** 0.50*** 
Proportion nonprofit revenue from public sources3 0.19*** 0.44*** 
Proportion religiously affiliated -0.00 0.00 
Notes: 1 natural log of the amount donated (winsorized) in 2012 US Dollars; *** p ≤ .001 
(two-tailed tests); 2 without US (N=111,537); 3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); results 
weighted by population scaling weight to represent the relative inclusion probability within 
each country.  
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & 
Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center 





Table 5. Fiscal incentive system and average incidence of giving and amount donated to 
charitable organizations 






1 Egalitarian France, Canada, South 
Korea, Japan, Ireland 
0.66 260 
2 Egalitarian & Pragmatic United Kingdom, 
Switzerland 
0.88 764 
3 Pragmatic Australia, Netherlands, 
United States, Norway, 
Austria, Taiwan, Israel, 
Germany 
0.67 395 
4 Pragmatic & 
Transitional 
Finland 0.73 29 
5 Transitional Mexico 0.84 27 
6 Transitional & 
Restrictive 
Russia 0.40 12 
7 Restrictive Indonesia 0.49 34 
Notes: 1 amount donated in 2012 US dollars (winsorized); results weighted by relative weight 
to represent an equal number of cases for each country (1/(number of cases country / number 
of total cases))/100). Not weighting the data or using the population weight drives the results 
respectively towards the overrepresented or underrepresented countries in the IIPD. Here we 
want to know what the average likelihood of giving is and amounts donated, based on the 
fiscal system, and weight all countries evenly. 





Table 6. Type of fundraising regime and average incidence of giving and amount donated 






1 Embryonic fund-raising 
regimes 
Indonesia 0.49 34 
2 Emerging fund-raising 
regimes 
Mexico, Taiwan, Russia 0.62 66 
3 Evident fund-raising 
regimes 
Norway, Finland, South 
Korea, Japan, Austria, 
Ireland, Israel 
0.61 206 
4 Established fund-raising 
regimes 





5 Advanced fund-raising 
regime 
United States 0.65 1,427 
Notes: 1 amount donated in 2012 US dollars (winsorized); results weighted by relative weight 
to represent an equal number of cases for each country (1/(number of cases country / number 
of total cases))/100). Not weighting the data or using the population weight drives the results 
respectively towards the overrepresented or underrepresented countries in the IIPD. Here we 
want to know what the average likelihood of giving is and amounts donated, based on the 
fundraising regime, and weight all countries evenly. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015). 
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Table 7. Maximum likelihood multilevel mixed-effects regression analyses of the likelihood of giving to charitable organizations 
(Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19)  
 (Only individual 
controls) 
(1) (2) (3) 
 OR S.E. OR S.E. OR S.E. OR S.E. 
Intercept 0.341*** 0.083 0.357 0.535 0.429(+) 0.209 0.207*** 0.074 
         
Contextual measure of 
institutionalization 
        
Ease of forming philanthropic 
organizations 
  0.990 0.332     
Fiscal incentives system1         
Egalitarian     0.531 0.346   
Egalitarian & Pragmatic     2.112 1.780   
Pragmatic     0.714 0.425   
Pragmatic & transitional, transitional, 
transitional & restrictive and 
restrictive (ref.) 
    -    
Type of fundraising regime         
Embryonic        1.678 1.689 
Emerging       2.002 1.302 
Evident (ref.)       -  
Established       2.743* 1.382 
Advanced       0.851 0.857 
         
Country-level variance 1.101** 0.359 1.101** 0.359 0.942** 0.307 0.885** .288 
ICC 0.251*** 0.061 0.251*** 0.061 0.223*** 0.056 0.212*** 0.054 
loglikelihood model (df) -65,421 (8) -65,421 (9) -65,419 (11) -65,418 (12) 
AIC 130,857  130,860  130,860  130,861  




Table 7 - continued. Maximum likelihood multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analyses of likelihood of giving to charitable organizations 
(Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19)  
 (4) (5) (6) 
 OR S.E. OR S.E. OR S.E. 
Intercept 0.311*** 0.095 0.460 0.312 0.162 0.216 
       
Contextual measure of institutionalization       
Number of nonprofit education programs2 1.060 0.041     
Proportion nonprofit revenue from public 
sources3 
  0.567 0.835   
Proportion religiously affiliated     2.527 4.126  
      
       
Country-level variance 0.967** 0.324 1.146** 0.384 1.082** 0.353 
ICC  0.227*** 0.059 0.258*** 0.064 0.248*** 0.061 
loglikelihood model (df) -61,433 (9) -58,379 (9) -65,420 (9) 
AIC 122884  116,778  130,859  
BIC 122971  116,864  130,946  
Notes: (+) p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); OR= Odds Ratio; 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional 
and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US 
(N=111,537); 3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the table): age, 
gender, educational level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et 
al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015).   
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Table 8. Maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel linear regression analyses of the natural log of the amount donated to charitable 
organizations (Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19)  
 (Only individual 
controls) 
(1) (2) (3) 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Intercept 0.074 0.262 -0.819 1.607 -0.335 0.488 -0.471 0.382 
         
Contextual measure of institutionalization         
Ease of forming philanthropic 
organizations 
  0.202 0.359     
Fiscal incentives system1         
Egalitarian     -0.028 0.654   
Egalitarian & Pragmatic     1.954* 0.844   
Pragmatic     0.502 0.597   
Pragmatic & transitional, transitional, 
transitional & restrictive and restrictive 
(ref.) 
    -    
Type of fundraising regime         
Embryonic        0.432 1.077 
Emerging       0.253 0.695 
Evident (ref.)       -  
Established       1.140* 0.539 
Advanced       1.169 1.077 
         
Country-level variance 1.288*** 0.034 1.266*** 0.033 0.947*** 0.025 1.012*** 0.027 
Individual-level variance 4.385*** 0.000 4.385*** 0.000 4.385*** 0.000 4.385*** 0.000 
ICC 0.227*** 0.057 0.224*** 0.056 0.178*** 0.047 0.188*** 0.050 
loglikelihood model (df) -256,437 (9) -256,436 (10) -256,434 (12) -256,434 (13) 
AIC 512,891  512,893  512,891  512,895  




Table 8 - continued. Maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel linear regression analyses of the natural log of the amount donated to 
charitable organizations (Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19)  
 (4) (5) (6) 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Intercept 0.011 0.322 -0.290 0.732 -1.885 1.364 
       
Contextual measure of institutionalization       
Number of nonprofit education programs2 0.076(+) 0.041     
Proportion nonprofit revenue from public 
sources3 
  0.854 1.588   
Proportion religiously affiliated     2.653 1.672  
      
       
Country-level variance  1.090*** 0.030 1.334*** 0.037 1.157*** 0.031 
Individual-level variance  4.088*** 0.000 4.490*** 0.000 4.387*** 0.000 
ICC 0.210*** 0.055 0.229*** 0.059 0.212*** 0.054 
loglikelihood model (df) -236,834 (10) -235,239 (10) -256,435 (10) 
AIC 473,688  470,498  512,891  
BIC 473,783  470,594  512,988  
Notes: (+) p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); ); 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive 
fiscal incentive systems only relate to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US (N=111,537); 
3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the table): age, gender, educational 
level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et 
al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015). 
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Table 9. Predicted probability of making a charitable donation and linear prediction of the 
amount donated to charitable organizations across nineteen countries estimated for the 
















.62*** .10 14.11*** 1.52 





.87*** .07 102.42*** 1.94 








.69*** .07 23.97*** 1.39 
4 Pragmatic & 
Transitional 
Finland .72*** .18 9.03* 2.56 
5 Transitional Mexico .92*** .07 32.88*** 2.55 
6 Transitional & 
Restrictive 
Russia .57** .22 7.64* 2.55 
7 Restrictive Indonesia .72*** .18 19.53*** 2.55 
Notes: (+) p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests which indicate that the 
estimations are significantly different from 0); Results based on estimations in Model 2 in 
Table 7 and Table 8 (only difference is that all categories of the fiscal incentive system were 
estimated, with “2 Egalitarian & pragmatic” as reference category), all other covariates fixed 
at their fullsample mean; 1 Ln amount donated calculated to absolute 2012 US dollars 
(winsorized). 





Table 10. Predicted probability of making a charitable donation and linear prediction of the 
amount donated to charitable organizations across nineteen countries estimated for the 








































.81*** .056 39.65*** 1.46 
5 Advanced fund-
raising regime 
United States .56* .232 40.82** 2.73 
Notes: (+) p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests which indicate that the 
estimations are significantly different from 0); Results based on estimations in Model 2 in 
Table 7 and Table 8, all other covariates fixed at their fullsample mean; 1 Ln amount donated 
calculated to absolute 2012 US dollars (winsorized). 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015). 
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Figure 1. Average annual philanthropic donation in 2012 US Dollars per person in nineteen 
countries (Source: IIPD, 2016) 
 
Note:  The philanthropic donations per person have been measured in the local currency of 
each country, and have been converted to the value of 2012 U.S. dollars using historical 
exchange rates (Oanda 2014) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) (U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2014). More information can be found in Online Appendix A and the IIPD 
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of giving to charitable organizations for the different 
continuous measures of institutionalization (Adjusted Predictions with 95% Cis; all other 
variables at mean)  
 




Figure 3. Linear prediction of the natural log of the amount donated to charitable 
organizations for the different measures of institutionalization (Adjusted Predictions with 
95% Cis; all other variables at mean)  
 







Appendix A includes a description of the individual datasets included in the International 
Individual Philanthropy Database (IIPD, 2016).  
 
<<Insert Appendix A about here>> 
 
Appendix B includes the correlations between contextual measures of institutionalization. 
 
<<Insert Appendix B about here>> 
 
Appendices C through F include robustness tests to investigate potential bias in the reported 
result resulting from our data.  
 
Rationale behind robustness tests and results of robustness tests 
In order to investigate the potential bias from the low number of countries included in our 
study, we used restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation in the analyses of amounts 
donated, as suggested by Elff et al. (2016). Appendix C includes the results of a REML 
mixed-effects multilevel linear regression analyses of the natural log of the amount donated 
to charitable organizations.1 Comparing the results of the REML estimation in Appendix C 
and the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in Table 8, we do not find significantly 
different results.  
 
<<Insert Appendix C about here>> 
 
Still, we feel that the low number and especially selective sample of countries 
included in this study may be driving the results. Therefore, we also conducted the analyses 
displayed in Table 7 and 8 without the two countries that appeared most influential from 
bivariate scatterplots, Germany and Japan. The results of these analyses are displayed in 
Appendices D1 and D2, and show that leaving out Germany and Japan, the results are a little 
more in line with what we expected from our hypotheses. Without Japan and Germany, the 
relationship between number of nonprofit programs and likelihood of giving and amounts 
donated is positive as expected, and people living in an established fundraising regime are 
more likely to give and give higher amounts than those living in an evident fundraising 
regime.2  
 
<<Insert Appendices D1 and D2 about here>> 
 
In order to control for the level of economic development in a country, which can also 
drive philanthropic giving and factors of institutionalization, Appendices E1 and E2 control 
for per capita Gross Net Income, Purchasing Power Parity (Current international dollars) in 
2003 (divided by 1,000), which precedes the collection of giving data across all countries 
(Worldbank, 2019).3 The results of the multilevel analyses including per capita GNI do not 
differ from the results in Tables 7 and 8, indicating that level of economic development does 
not influence the relationship between our measures of institutionalization and philanthropic 
giving. Also, we find no relationship between level of economic development and likelihood 
of giving and amounts donated.  
 





Finally, Appendix F shows the results for maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel 
logistic and linear regression analyses including all contextual variables simultaneously. 
Because of the high correlation between the different measures of institutionalization, and 
because of the low number of countries included in the study, these models including six 
contextual factors are likely not very robust, the very strong estimated Odds Ratio’s and 
coefficients are also an indication for this.  
 
<<Insert Appendix F about here>> 
 
Endnotes 
1 In Stata 15 it is not possible conduct multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analyses 
with REML.  
2 Excluding one of the nineteen countries each time, we found that excluding most of the 
countries resulted in similar effect sizes. The main exception is the United Kingdom. When 
we exclude the United Kingdom from the analyses, the effect sizes are comparable with those 
reported with Tables 7 and 8, but the relationships are not significant. When excluding the 
Netherlands, the relationship between the likelihood of giving and established fundraising 
regime and evident fundraising regime is not significantly different. Excluding either 
Germany, Switzerland or Japan resulted in a positive significant relationship between the 
number of nonprofit education programs and level of giving (at p≤ .05). Overall, our findings 
appear robust against the exclusion of one country, although in the case of the United 
Kingdom caution is warranted. 
3 The Worldbank’s description of this measure: “GNI per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power 
over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all 
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of 
output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) 
from abroad. Data are in current international dollars based on the 2011 ICP round.” 
(Worldbank, 2019). The correlations between the different measures of institutionalization 
and per capita GNI is displayed in Appendix B. Typically, a higher level of economic 
development corresponds with higher levels of institutionalization.   
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Appendix A. International Individual Philanthropy Database (IIPD)  
Individual International Philanthropy Database 
The Individual International Philanthropy Database is a harmonized dataset composed of 
microdata from 19 countries: Australia, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, United States 
of America, Canada, Norway, Finland, Mexico, South Korea, Japan, Austria, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, Ireland, Israel, Russia, Switzerland and Germany. The datasets were collected 
between 2004 and 2010 (see Table 1).  
 
































One-off study - - 
United 
Kingdom 
Helping Out  2006-
2008 
One-off study - - 

















Longitudinal 3rd wave 5 
























































3rd wave Unknown  







Longitudinal 1st wave Unknown 
Austria Findings on 
giving in 




















Longitudinal 4th wave 4 




































































1st wave 3 
1 Current number of waves refers to the number of waves conducted before May 2014. 




Sample composition (overview) 




























- CASI Yes based on age, gender, 
social class, region, and 
household size to make it 




N=2,705 60% CAPI Yes, weighting to correct 
for bias due to sampling 
methods 




N=7,251 - CATI Yes, weighted to adjust for 
the unequal probability of 
selection into the original 
1968 low-income over-
sample, the 1997 
immigrant refresher, and 
attrition. 
 



















Yes, a weighed-in sub-
sample of 359 respondents 
from Africa and Asia 
Finland N=701 - Telephone 
interviews 
No 





N=1,005 - - No 
Japan N=5,121 - - No 
Austria 
 
N=1,019 - Computer-assisted 
face-to-face  
interviews 
Yes, based on age, sex, 
federal state, and size of 
municipality 








Ireland N=6,884  www.ucd.ie/issda/ Yes, based on the CSO 
weighting system 
Israel N=1,498 52% Telephone survey No 











Yes, applying frequency 




58.7 CATI Yes, a post stratification 
weight variable that 
corrects for different 
selection probabilities in 
respect to cantons and 
household size. It also 
extrapolates the sample 
with respects to age, 
nationality, gender and 
education to the Swiss 
resident population 
parameters. 
Source: Wiepking & Handy (2016). 
 
A detailed sample composition is provided for every country in the IIPD Data documentation 
(Wiepking & Handy, 2016). 
 
Table 3   Country specific information to take into account when working with the IIPD 
(2016) 
Country Country specific information 
Australia - 
France - 
United Kingdom • The number of non-donors in cidont and cadont did not match because of 
6 very small donors (amount donated was rounded down to 0), we recoded 
these 6 cases donating virtually nothing to non-donors on cidont;  
• The amount question was only asked for donors who donated during the 
previous four weeks, amounts donated were not asked to respondents that 
only donated over the course of last year, for which incidence was 
measured. Hence those not donating last four weeks, but donated last year 
(N=282) are missing (999999) on cadont. 
• Amount donated was asked for past four weeks, and then multiplied by 13 
to get the amount donated on a yearly basis. 
Netherlands - 




Norway Description weight variable Vekt 1 is used because there is an oversampled 
group of immigrants from Africa and Asia in the data set. With Vekt 1, 
they are weighted according to their share of the population.  
Finland Amount donated and income is based on categorical var, top category 
recoded as lowest boundary ("over 100 euros", coded as 100) 
Mexico Data submitted was automatically weighted, set weight off. 
South Korea Researchers have to mention that the Korean data is Giving Korea, 
constructed by the Beautiful Foundation in Korea. 
Japan Researchers wanting to use the Japanese data need to ask Naoto Yamauchi. 
Austria - 
Indonesia - 
Taiwan Table 25.5 in Palgrave book (Tobit) is wrong, because of the coding error 
(999997 and 999998) were treated as amounts rather than missings: "1. 
Religious giving: 30 cases indicating "forgot", 7 cases indicating "refused";   
2. Secular donations: 15 cases indicating "forgot", 2 cases indicating 
"refused". Therefore, there are 37 cases with incorrect values of religious 
giving and 17 cases with incorrect values of secular giving, respectively. 
For total giving, the number of cases with incorrect value of total giving is 
46 because eight cases have incorrect values for both religious and secular 
giving." Data included in the IIPD is corrected and correct. 
Ireland • age is measured in categories 10-20-30-40-50-60-70-80 converted to 
<35;36-65;>65 using midpoints of original data, except for lowest category 
(=14) and highest (=80). 
Weight is absolute weight, but statistical software accounts for this. 
Israel Religion in Israel is different. recoded the Jewish, the Muslims and the 
Christians to “other”, as we also do not know whether they are Orthodox or 
Roman Catholic (or Protestant). We made an exception and included the 
original religious affiliation variable with the data for Israel (treligion). we 
set Tromcat and tprot to 999999 as we do not know whether christians are 
roman catholic or protestant / Note the big outlier in amounts donated. 
The highest value on “tadont” is 5,868,622, which is a lot higher than the 
second highest value of 293,431, Trespnr=415 was extreme outlier, with 
donation of 5,868,622 US Dollar, while only 19 years old. It could always 
be a possibility that it is a correct donation, but following the advice of the 




Russia Income in seven categories: below 172 US Dollar in 2012; 172 – 344; 344 
– 516; 516  - 860; 860 – 1548; 1548 – 2064; over 2064 2012 US dollar. The 
only condition for using the data is to mention our Centre as an institution 
which elaborated the methodology and questionnaire for Russian data and 
conducted the data collection. The complete name of the Centre is The 
Center for Studies of Civil Society and the Nonprofit Sector, National 
Research University Higher School of Economics. 
Germany The religious affiliation variables "wromcat", "wprot" and "wothrel" are 
adopted from the 2007 wave of the survey 
The religious attendance variable "wrelatt" is adopted from the 2009 wave.  
 The generalized social trust measure "wtrust" is adopted from the 2008 
wave.  
Arjen de Wit and Marius Mews took a closer look at the weighting variable 
and found out that there is an independent sample in the data (in the SOEP 
documentation it is referred to as the 'Incentive Sample', which is included 
in the 'Innovation Sample' after 2012). These households distort the 
distribution and score 0 on the weighting variable. the ~2,000 respondents 
from the oversample are excluded in the data prepared for IIPD. 
Switzerland Only the post stratification weight is needed. The design weight  weighs for 
selection probability after canton (state) and household size. The post 
stratification weight extrapolates the sample to be representative for the 
population as measured in the 2000 census and hast the design weight 
included. From the method report: (Um Stichprobenverzerrungen für 
Auswertungen zu korrigieren, wurden zwei Gewichte berechnet. Das 
Designgewicht (Variable des_gew) gewichtet für die unterschiedlichen 
Auswahlwahrscheinlichkeiten nach Kanton und Haushaltsgrösse. Das 
Poststratifikationsgewicht kombiniert das Designgewicht mit einer 
Poststratifikation, welche die gewichteten Bevölkerungsanteile hinsichtlich 
Alter, Nationalität, Geschlecht und Bildung auf die Eckwerte der 
Wohnbevölkerung über 15 Jahren gemäss Volkszählung 2000 
hochgerechnet (Variable gew_tot). 




Appendix B. Correlations between contextual measures of institutionalization 
(Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19) 
 
Notes: All correlations are significant at p < 0.001; 1 without US (N=111,537); 2 without 
Indonesia (N=108,376); 3 Per capita GNI based on PPP in 2003 in current international 
Dollars/1,000. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & 
Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center 




(1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)2 (6) (7)3 
(1) Ease of forming philanthropic 
organizations 
1 
     
 
(2) Fiscal incentives system -0.847 1 
    
 
(3) Number of nonprofit education 
programs1 
0.514 -0.690 1 
   
 
(4) Fundraising regime 0.819 -0.788 0.668 1 
  
 
(5) Proportion nonprofit revenue 
from public sources2 
0.753 -0.742 0.330 0.591 1 
 
 
(6) Proportion religiously affiliated -0.342 0.509 -0.422 -0.447 -0.166 1  
(7) Per capita GNI3  0.884 -0.854 0.558 0.923 0.658 -0.382 1 
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Appendix C. Restricted maximum likelihood (REML) mixed-effects multilevel linear 
regression analyses of the natural log of the amount donated to charitable organizations 
(Nindividual=118,788; Ncountry=19) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
               
Ease of forming 
philanthropic orgs  0.202      
  (0.380)      
Egalitarian   -0.0282     
   (0.736)     
Egalitarian & 
pragmatic   1.954*     
   (0.950)     
Pragmatic   0.502     
   (0.672)     
Taxtypes 4,5,6,7 
(ref.)1   -     
# np educ progs2    0.0760~    
    (0.0431)    
embryonic     0.432   
     (1.254)   
Emerging     0.253   
     (0.810)   
Evident (ref.)     -   
established     1.140~   
     (0.628)   
Advanced     1.169   
     (1.254)   
        
        
Proportion np 
revenue from public 
sources3      0.854  
      (1.684)  
Proportion 
religiously affiliated       2.652 
       (1.767) 
        
Constant 0.0738 -0.819 -0.335 0.0108 -0.470 -0.290 -2.094 
 (0.269) (1.699) (0.549) (0.341) (0.445) (0.776) (1.438) 
        
Observations 118,788 118,788 118,788 111,537 118,788 108,376 118,788 
Number of groups 19 19 19 18 19 18 19 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10      
Notes: 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate 
to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US (N=111,537); 
3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the 
table): age, gender, educational level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); 
Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & 
Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015).
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Appendix D1. Maximum likelihood multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analyses of 
likelihood of giving to charitable organizations, without Germany and Japan  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 










ratio odds ratio 
Ease of forming 
philanthropic orgs  1.188          
  (0.320)      
Egalitarian   0.854     
   (0.475)     
Egalitarian & 
pragmatic   2.077     
   (1.418)     
Pragmatic   0.877     
   (0.433)     
Taxtypes 4,5,6,7 (ref.)1   -     
# np educ progs2    1.074**    
    (0.0288)    
embryonic     1.253   
     (0.898)   
Emerging     1.484   
     (0.697)   
Evident (ref.)     -   
established     2.849**   
     (1.096)   
Advanced     0.614   
     (0.440)   
Proportion np revenue 
from public sources3      1.001  
      (1.242)  
Proportion religiously 
affiliated       0.0778 
       (0.118) 
        
Constant 0.479*** 0.226 0.481~ 0.448*** 0.313*** 0.531 3.936 
 (0.0981) (0.269) (0.190) (0.0975) (0.0859) (0.297) (5.001) 
        
Observations 98,522 98,522 98,522 91,271 98,522 88,110 98,522 
Number of groups 17 17 17 16 17 16 17 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~p<0.10      
Notes: 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate 
to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US; 3 without Indonesia; 
individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the table): age, gender, educational level, 
marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); Mirabella 
& Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock (2017); 
Wiepking & Handy (2015). 
Appendix D2. Maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel linear regression analyses of the 
natural log of the amount donated to charitable organizations, excluding Germany and Japan  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES          
Ease of forming 
philanthropic orgs  0.420~           
  (0.235)      
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Egalitarian   0.636     
   (0.400)     
Egalitarian & 
Pragmatic   1.928***     
   (0.489)     
Pragmatic   0.727*     
   (0.354)     
Taxtypes 4,5,6,7 
(ref.)1   -     
# np educ progs2    
0.0926**
*    
    (0.0233)    
Embryonic     0.0149   
     (0.621)   
Emerging     -0.172   
     (0.407)   
Evident (ref.)     -   
Established     1.057**   
     (0.333)   
Advanced     0.704   
     (0.621)   
Proportion np 
revenue from public 
sources3      1.511  
      (1.094)  
Proportion 
religiously affiliated       -1.066 
       (1.520) 
        
Constant 0.418* -1.414 -0.256 0.387* 0.0347 -0.184 1.297 
 
(0.192
) (1.038) (0.283) (0.189) (0.238) (0.494) (1.268) 
        
Observations 98,522 98,522 98,522 91,271 98,522 88,110 98,522 
Number of groups 17 17 17 16 17 16 17 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p<0.10       
Notes: 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate 
to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US; 3 without Indonesia; 
individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the table): age, gender, educational 
level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); 
Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & 
Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015).
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Appendix E1. Maximum likelihood multilevel mixed-effects regression analyses of the 
likelihood of giving to charitable organizations, controlling for per capita GNI  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
ease of forming 
philanthropic orgs  1.050      
  (0.489)      
Tax system        
Egalitarian   0.574     
   (0.436)     
Egalitarian & Pragmatic   2.371     
   (2.418)     
Pragmatic   0.775     
   (0.556)     
Tax systems 4,5,6,7 (ref.)1        
# np educ progs2    1.063    
    (0.0424)    
Fundraising regime        
Embryonic     1.979   
     (3.155)   
Emerging     2.314   
     (2.928)   
Evident (ref.)        
Established     2.691~   
     (1.408)   
Advanced     0.792   
     (0.904)   
Proportion np revenue 
from public sources3      0.569  
      (0.935)  
Proportion religiously 
affiliated       2.517 
       (4.251) 
        
GNI 0.997 0.994 0.995 0.995 1.007 1.000 1.000 
 (0.0221) (0.0306) (0.0262) (0.0225) (0.0517) (0.0283) (0.023) 
Constant 0.373 0.318 0.461 0.350~ 0.169 0.461 0.164 
 (0.234) (0.516) (0.278) (0.210) (0.261) (0.379) (0.266) 
        
Observations 118,788 118,788 118,788 111,537 118,788 108,376 118,788 
Number of groups 19 19 19 18 19 18 19 
      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10     
Standard errors in parentheses; Odds ratio’s     
 
Notes: 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate 
to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US (N=111,537); 
3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the 
table): age, gender, educational level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); 
Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & 




Appendix E2. Maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel linear regression analyses of the 
natural log of the amount donated to charitable organizations, controlling for per capita GNI 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
Ease of forming 
philanthropic orgs  0.0374      
  (0.496)      
Egalitarian   0.0479     
   (0.762)     
Egalitarian & 
Pragmatic   2.066*     
   (1.021)     
Pragmatic   0.580     
   (0.720)     
Taxtypes 4,5,6,7 (ref.)1        
# np educ progs2    0.0703~    
    (0.0421)    
Embryonic     0.424   
     (1.705)   
Emerging     0.246   
     (1.354)   
Evident (ref.)        
Established     1.141*   
     (0.560)   
Advanced     1.173   
     (1.222)   
        
        
Proportion np revenue 
from public sources3      0.415  
      (1.755)  
Proportion religiously 
affiliated       3.193~ 
       (1.660) 
        
GNI 0.017 0.016 -0.005 0.011 -0.000 0.017 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.026) -0.0239 (0.055) (0.030) (0.022) 
Constant -0.382 -0.502 -0.266 -0.251 -0.461 -0.570 -3.225* 
 (0.669) (1.730) (0.604) -0.633 (1.649) (0.879) (1.600) 
        
Observations 118,788 118,788 118,788 111,537 118,788 108,376 118,788 
Number of groups 19 19 19 18 19 18 19 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10     
Notes: 1 Because the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only relate 
to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; 2 without US (N=111,537); 
3 without Indonesia (N=108,376); individual control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the 
table): age, gender, educational level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & Scaife (2015); 
Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center (2012); Salamon, Sokolowski, & 
Haddock (2017); Wiepking & Handy (2015); Worldbank (2019). 
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Appendix F. Maximum likelihood mixed-effects multilevel logistic (Model 1) and linear 
(Model 2) regression analyses, including all measures of institutionalization simultaneously  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Odds ratio B 
Ease of forming philanthropic 
organizations 0.860 -0.376 
 (0.383) (0.390) 
Tax system   
Egalitarian 0.442 0.347 
 (0.424) (0.841) 
Egalitarian & pragmatic 0.691 1.188 
 (0.746) (0.946) 
Pragmatic 0.674 0.589 
 (0.554) (0.720) 
Tax systems 4,5,6,7 (ref.)1   
# np educ progs 1.055 0.0507 
 (0.0475) (0.0394) 
Fundraising regime   
emerging 1.045 -0.119 
 (1.020) (0.856) 
Embryonic, evident and advanced 
(ref.)   
established 2.317 0.878~ 
 (1.387) (0.524) 
Proportion np revenue from public 
sources 0.712 0.463 
 (1.539) (1.893) 
Proportion religiously affiliated 3.198 3.914* 
 (6.318) (1.729) 
Constant 0.341 -2.267 
 (0.781) (2.010) 
   
Observations 101,125 101,125 
Number of groups 17 17 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10 
Notes: Because the United States is excluded from the measure number of nonprofit 
education programs, and because Indonesia does not have a value for proportion of nonprofit 
revenue from public sources, these two countries were excluded from the analyses; 1 Because 
the (combinations of) pragmatic, transitional and restrictive fiscal incentive systems only 
relate to one country in our sample, we used these categories as reference category; individual 
control variables included in the analyses (but not presented in the table): age, gender, 
educational level, marital status and the natural log of income. 
Sources: IIPD (2016); Adelman et al. (2015); Charities Aid Foundation (2016); Breeze & 
Scaife (2015); Mirabella & Wish (2001); Mirabella et al. (2007); Pew Research Center 
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